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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether the Japanese voters became happy and/or unhappy due 
to the results of the General Election in 2009. We conducted a daily web survey for 
seven days before and after the election, obtaining 1068 responses. Estimating a fixed 
effects model, we found that supporters of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the 
winner, became significantly happier, and supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Japan (LDP) and New Komeito, the losers, became significantly unhappier on the day 
following the election. However, happiness returned to the previous level in one or two 
days, implying people adapted to the news very quickly. Dividing those who support the 
policies of DPJ into two groups, those who expect material benefits from the victory of 
DPJ and those who do not, we demonstrated that the reason why the supporters of the 
winner (DPJ) felt happy was not because they obtained material benefits from the 
change of government. We also found that the happiness level of those whose 
expectation of the election results were realized did not change, while that of those 
whose expectation differed from the reality changed substantially. In a word, only 
unexpected results matter.     
 
 
Keywords: happiness, election, expectation, survey, Japan 
JEL classification: I31, D72
3 
 
1.  Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the mechanisms by which election results affect 
happiness. This topic has not been examined up until now.  
Though the economics of happiness has a long tradition stretching back to Van Praag’s 
Leiden school, it was only after 2000 that many economists began to be attracted by this topic. 
Since then, research has extended into various fields including the study of political processes.
1 
Among these studies, Frey and Stutzer have elucidated how democracy is important to 
happiness, analyzing the political institutions in Switzerland (Frey and Stutzer 2002a, Frey 
2008). Recently, Bok has opened up the study of the politics of happiness（Bok, 2010). This 
paper can be regarded as part of the field of “politics and happiness,” since it analyzes the 
relationship between elections and happiness.  
We investigate whether news of election results affects the happiness of voters. Kimball et 
al. (2006) examined the effects of hurricane Katrina on the happiness of U.S. residents, and 
Uchida et al. (2013) and Ishino et al. (2013) investigated the effect of the Great East Japan 
Earthquake on the happiness of Japanese people. Since elections are macro events, the present 
study can be regarded as an investigation of the effect of macro news on happiness.  
                                                   
1
 For a survey on the economics of happiness, see Frey and Stucher (2002a, b), Bruni and Porta 
(2005), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) and Clark et al. (2008). 
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In the past there have been few studies that investigate whether elections affect happiness.
2
 
The few exceptions we know of are Gilbert et al. (1998), Wilson et al. (2003), Tsutsui et al. 
(2010), and Kimball et al. (2014). This study tries to add to this sparse literature. In addition, we 
analyze two problems that the previous studies did not address. The first of these is hedonic 
adaptation. People have a baseline level of happiness from which their happiness temporarily 
jumps up (down) when good (bad) news arrives, but their happiness returns to the individual 
baseline rather quickly (Kimball and Willis, 2006). Personal news has about five times the 
influence of macro news, and the influence and the impact of personal news is more persistent; 
in contrast, the impact of macro news lasts only about two days (Kimball et al. 2007). Therefore, 
although election results might affect voters’ happiness just after the election, we would expect 
happiness to revert to its previous level immediately. Of course, the extent of the influence, the 
size, and the time that the effects last all depend on the nature of the macro news. For example, 
Hurricane Katrina lowered Americans’ happiness for three weeks (Kimball et al. 2006).  
Wilson et al. (2003) investigated the impact of the U.S. presidential election in 2000. They 
asked 52 college students, who reported themselves to be deeply interested in politics, about 
their happiness one day after Gore conceded the election. Bush supporters were significantly 
happier than Gore supporters.  
                                                   
2
 Of course, elections have been studied in numerous papers, such as Vergne (2009), Hindriks and 
Lockwood (2009), and in Japan Hori (1996) and Taniguchi (2005). However, there has been only a 
limited number of studies that relate elections and happiness. 
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On the other hand, Gilbert et al. (1998) analyzed happiness among 57 voters in a 1994 
gubernatorial election in Texas one month after the election, and found no evidence that winners 
became happier than losers.  
Using a monthly survey, Tsutsui et al. (2010) examined whether the landslide victory of the 
Koizumi Cabinet in the general election on September 11, 2005 made Japanese people happy 
and/or unhappy. The authors found no significant changes in the happiness of supporters and 
non-supporters of the ruling parties between August and September. However, they found that 
the happiness of supporters of winners (losers) tends to rise (fall), although the results are 
statistically insignificant; this suggests that Japanese people’s happiness was only slightly 
affected by the election results.  
Kimball et al. (2014) looked at the dynamic response of happiness to outcomes of the 2008 
and 2012 U.S. Presidential elections. They developed a model to show how individual's 
emotions reacted to electoral outcomes, based on the model of Kimball and Willis (2006). They 
found that the strength of political preferences, as well as prior expectations about the election 
outcome, determined the size of the change in happiness from before to after the election. They 
also found that individuals hedonically adapt very quickly. 
These studies suggest that adaptation is a critical factor, and that election results generally 
affect happiness only for a short time following the election. To examine this hypothesis, we 
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conducted a daily survey that covers the period before and after a voting day. This enables us to 
elucidate not only whether election results affect happiness just after the election, but also how 
this effect disappears over time. Specifically, we conducted a daily survey about the election for 
the House of Representatives conducted on August 30, 2009, obtaining 1068 responses from 
people of various generations. This election was a historic event in that the Liberal Democratic 
Party of Japan (LDP) and New Komeito, then in power, lost in a landslide, and the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) took power. This was a very rare event in Japan. We analyze whether the 
supporters for LDP and New Komeito became unhappier, and whether supporters for DPJ 
became happier, and measure the speed of hedonic adaptation for both.  
 We also investigate why election results affect happiness. Traditional economics holds 
that peoples’ utility is determined by the material benefits they enjoy. To examine whether this 
materialism applies to happiness as well, we compare the happiness of two groups – one who 
expected to receive material benefit from a DPJ victory, and another who did not. Traditional 
economics would predict that the former group experienced a more positive change in happiness 
than the latter group. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the election and our survey are 
explained. Section 3 reports our main results. In section 4 we check the robustness of our main 
results. Specifically, we use the data on changes in happiness instead of the level of happiness 
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and check if the main results are maintained. We also separate the sample into those whose 
election predictions were correct and incorrect, and check if the results apply only for the latter 
group. In section 5, we investigate the reason why the election results made people happy and 
unhappy. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The election and our survey 
2.1  The election on August 30, 2009 
The election in our study is the 45
th
 general election of the Japanese House of Representatives, 
conducted on August 30, 2009. In this election, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost power 
and Democratic Party Japan (DPJ) won a majority and took power. Since the founding of the 
LDP in 1955, this was the first election in which the LDP did not win a plurality, and only the 
second instance in which it did not control the legislature.
3
 Thus, this election was the most 
dramatic one in Japan’s recent history.4 Just before the election, Mr. Aso was prime minister 
and the LDP held 303 seats (out of a total of 480), while its coalition partner New Komeito 
shared 31. After the election, these parties’ seats shrank to 119 and 21, respectively. The DPJ, 
which held only 112 seats before the election, held 308 afterward.  
 
2.2  Our survey 
                                                   
3
 The Hosokawa cabinet, a non-LDP coalition, briefly took power in 1993. 
4
 The LDP won 294 seats in the next general election, in December 2012, returning to power. 
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We conducted a web-survey from August 27 to September 2, a period that includes the day of 
the election. The respondents were 1068 (male=486, female=582) eligible voters from all over 
Japan. While some questions, including “How happy are you?” and “Did you sleep well last 
night?” were asked every day during the survey period, other questions varied from day to day. 
Specifically, on August 27, the first day of the survey, we asked about the attributes of 
respondents such as scholastic performance and income, and on the 28
th
 we asked about their 
party sympathies, election predictions, and desired outcome. On August 31, the day after the 
election, we asked whether respondents voted or not, which party they voted for, and whether 
the results were in line with their expectations. 
Table 1 shows the number of supporters of each party. 24% supported the DPJ, while 13% 
supported the LDP. 
 
3. How did the happiness of respondents change according to their political allegiance? 
The main aim of this paper is to determine whether supporters of the deposed parties, LDP and 
New Komeito, became unhappier just after learning the results of the election, and/or whether 
supporters of DPJ (which won a landslide victory) became happier. We also investigate the 
progress of hedonic adaptation, i.e. how fast happiness returned to its previous level. In doing so, 
we need to be careful of two potential confounds. One is that when the polls closed at 20:00, 
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television stations began to announce their prediction of the seats based on their own exit 
polling, so that respondents who answered after 20:00 may have known part of the election 
results. Thus, responses on 30
th
 include some who knew the election results. However, this 
number was probably minor, and confirmation of the results happened only on the 31
st
.
5
 Given 
these facts, we conclude that it is appropriate to compare the happiness on the 31
st
 with that on 
the 29
th
 in order to measure the effect of the
 
election. 
 The second potential issue is that happiness level varies every day due to events other 
than the election. Thus, it is not appropriate to directly compare the average happiness levels of 
supporters of a party on different days. Rather, we need to normalize the happiness of supporters 
of a party on a day by subtracting the average happiness of all the respondents on that day.
6
  
Figure 1 shows the normalized happiness of supporters of the DPJ, LDP, and New Komeito 
during the observation period. The happiness of DPJ supporters rose on the 31
st
 and returned to 
its original level on September 1
st
. The happiness of LDP supporters dipped on the 31
st
, but 
substantially recovered
 
on September 1
st
. The happiness of New Komeito supporters fell 
substantially on the 30
th
 and dipped further on the 31
st
; although it recovered on September 1
st
, it 
                                                   
5
 We retrieved the time of responses only on the last day (September 2), and 20% of the respondents 
answered after 20:00 on that day (and 13% after 21:00). 
6 We also constructed a normalized indicator of happiness by dividing by the average of all the 
respondents on that day rather than subtracting. The results are quite similar to those reported in this 
paper.  
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did not return to its original level by the end of the sample period.
7
 These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that supporters of the winning party become happier and those of 
the losing party become less happy as a result of the election.  
Figure 1 also shows that hedonic adaptation happened quickly. The happiness of DPJ and 
LDP supporters returned to their original levels very quickly. Even the happiness of New 
Komeito supporters, which fell more than that of LDP supporters, recovered substantially on 
September 1
st
, though not totally.  
Regression analysis allows us to verify the significance of these results. We take the 29
th
 as 
the benchmark, since some respondents might have known the results after 8:00 P.M. on the 30
th
. 
Explanatory variables are day-dummies from August 27
th
 to September 2
nd
 (August 29
th
 is 
excluded as the benchmark) and interaction terms of these day-dummies with party support 
dummies. Thus, the regression equation for DPJ supporters is: 
𝐻𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑎27𝐷𝐴𝑌27𝑡 + 𝑎28𝐷𝐴𝑌28𝑡+𝑎30𝐷𝐴𝑌30𝑡+𝑎31𝐷𝐴𝑌31𝑡
+ 𝑎01𝐷𝐴𝑌01𝑡+𝑎02𝐷𝐴𝑌02𝑡 + 𝑏27𝐷𝑃𝐽𝑖･𝐷𝐴𝑌27𝑡
+ 𝑏28𝐷𝑃𝐽𝑖･𝐷𝐴𝑌28𝑡+𝑏30𝐷𝑃𝐽𝑖･𝐷𝐴𝑌30𝑡+𝑏31𝐷𝑃𝐽𝑖･𝐷𝐴𝑌31𝑡
+ 𝑏01𝐷𝑃𝐽𝑖･𝐷𝐴𝑌01𝑡+𝑏02𝐷𝑃𝐽𝑖･𝐷𝐴𝑌02𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  ,                                         (1) 
where DAY27 is a day-dummy for August 27
th
, and so on. DPJ is a dummy variable indicating 
                                                   
7
 This result may reflect the fact that New Komeito is smaller than the LDP and the DPJ, and has 
many dedicated supporters. See also footnote 17. 
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support for the DPJ. For the regression measuring the happiness of LDP supporters, the DPJ 
dummy is replaced with an LDP dummy in eq. (1). In order to control for personal 
characteristics that are constant over the observation period, we estimate the equation with a 
fixed effects model. DPJi does not appear alone in equation (1) because it is an 
individual-specific term. We call this specification Model 1.  
We also estimate a Model 2, in which variables that change every day are added as controls. 
These include:   
SLEEP:  Did you sleep well last night? 
1. poor sleep, 2. slightly poor sleep, 3. slept well, 4. slept very well 
SLEEP is defined as the answer, which represents the quality of sleep.  
HEALTH: How is your health now? 
1. good, 2. generally good, 3. generally not good, 4. bad 
HEALTH is defined as five minus the answer to this question, so that a larger number indicates 
better health. 
WORK: Have you already worked (or attended a class) today or are you going to attend 
a class today? 
1. I have worked, 2. I will be working, 3. I am working now, 4. No work today 
Dummy variables WORK_DONE, WORK_AFTER, and WORK_NOW take unity if the answer is 
12 
 
1, 2, and 3, respectively and zero otherwise.  
NEWS:  Recall the most important personal news or event that occurred since you 
answered this questionnaire yesterday. How did you evaluate the news? 
Choose a number between -5 and 5. 5 is “very good,” -5 is “very bad.” 
NEWS is defined as the answer to this question.
8
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for these variables. For SLEEP and HEALTH, the 
average of each variable exceeds 2.5. The average of “personal news” is positive, implying that 
good personal news is more frequent than bad. 
In Table 3, the estimates for the regression with the DPJ dummy are presented. In Model 1 
the coefficient on the interaction term between DPJ and DAY31 is positive and significant at the 
1% level, implying that DPJ supporters became significantly happier than they were before the 
election. In Model 2, the coefficient becomes smaller, but is still significant at the 10% level. 
Among the control variables, the coefficients on HEALTH and NEWS are positive and 
significant, taking large values. 
In Table 4 the results for LDP supporters are shown. In Model 1, the interaction term 
between LDP and DAY31 is significantly negative at the 5% level, and in Model 2 significant at 
the 10% level. The interaction term between LDP and DAY27 is also significantly negative.  
                                                   
8
 We asked a similar question about macro news, i.e. news conveyed by media like TV and 
newspapers. Thus, the news about the election is not included in this personal news. 
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In Table 5, in addition to DPJ and LDP, we present the coefficient on the interaction terms 
between DAY30 and DAY31
 
and
 
New Komeito, old (before the election) ruling party supporters, 
new (after the election) ruling party supporters, pro-Aso-cabinet, and anti-Aso-cabinet. 
Supporters of New Komeito became unhappier not only on 31
st
 but also on 30
th 
already. Yet, the 
coefficient of the interaction term between New Komeito and DAY31 is larger. Supporters of the 
old ruling party show the same tendency. Supporters of the new ruling party became happier 
only on the 31
st 
in Model 1. Pro-Aso-cabinet respondents were unhappier both on the 30
th
 and 
31
st
. On the other hand, anti-Aso-cabinet respondents were happier on both days. All of these 
results are generally consistent with our hypothesis. 
 
4.  Robustness check 
We check the robustness of the results presented in the previous section using the data on 
changes in happiness and on expectations.  
4.1  Changes in happiness 
In the survey, we asked every day not only about happiness levels, but also about changes in 
happiness: 
Your happiness today compared with your happiness yesterday (before) is  
1. very happy, 2. fairly happy, 3. slightly happy, 4. same as yesterday (before), 5. slightly 
14 
 
unhappy, 6. fairly unhappy, 7. very unhappy 
We define CHANGE as eight minus this answer. The average change in happiness exceeds 4 
(average of 1 to 7), implying that level of happiness defined as the sum of these changes in 
happiness is increasing (see Table 2).
9
 
Although one might think that changes in happiness should be the same as the first 
difference of the reported level of happiness, the changes people reported were very different 
from the first difference of the levels they reported. While the average of the latter is around 
zero, the average of the former exceeds 4 (average of 1 to 7), so that if we were to calculate the 
happiness level as the sum of the reported happiness changes, we would find that happiness 
grows more or less continuously.
10
  
Because the variable CHANGE also varies every day due to various reasons, we normalize 
it by subtracting each day’s average. In Figure 2, we present CHANGE for DPJ, LDP, and New 
Komeito supporters. While LDP and New Komeito supporters reported negative happiness 
changes on the 31
st
, DPJ supporters reported positive changes. In addition, on September 1
st
, 
happiness rose for LDP and New Komeito supporters and declined for DPJ supporters, which 
may have been reactions to the large drop on the previous day. 
                                                   
9
 Tsutsui and Ohtake (2012) report that the same tendency is evident in their daily happiness survey 
over 300 days! 
10
 Tsutsui and Ohtake (2012) confirm this using 300 daily data and show that the reason why these 
two series differ is that adaptation is perfect in the latter case, while only 1/3 of the happiness is 
adapted in the former. 
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 When we regress happiness changes on the day dummies and the interaction terms 
between day dummies and the DPJ dummy, the coefficient of the interaction term is significant 
only on the 31
st
 at the 1% level (results not shown). This result does not change when we add 
the control variables (Model 2). As for the LDP supporters, happiness declined on the 31
st
 
(significant at the 5% level) and on the 27
th
 (significant at the 10% level).
11
  
 
4.2 Only unexpected results affected happiness 
One suspects that a fully anticipated election result would not truly be news, and hence would 
not have an effect on happiness. Only an unexpected result should have an impact. In this 
subsection, we examine that hypothesis.          
On the day following the election (the 31
st
), we asked respondents: “Were the election 
results what you expected?”, and requested them to choose from “as expected,” “a little bit 
different from expectation,” “substantially different from expectation,” and “completely 
different from expectation.” We then divided the sample into those who answered “as expected” 
and those who answered otherwise. In Figure 3, we present the normalized happiness for the 
two groups of DPJ supporters. The “as expected” group numbered 185 and all others numbered 
67, indicating that many people expected the correct result. Comparing happiness levels on the 
                                                   
11 They lose the significance when we add the control variables; it did not significantly decline on 
any day at the 10% level. 
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29
th
 and 31
st
, while happiness is almost flat for those who answered “as expected,” it greatly 
increased on the 31
st
 for those who chose the other options.  
In Figure 4, the results of the same analysis for LDP supporters are presented. Here, the 
number of people who chose “as expected” is 71 and the other options 68. Comparing happiness 
on the 29
th
 and 31
st
, while happiness of the “as expected” group did not change, the happiness of 
the others dropped substantially on 31
st
.  
Thus, these results reveal that both DPJ and LDP supporters experienced increased 
happiness only when they faced unexpected results. This offers one more example of the general 
proposition in Economics that only unexpected things matter.   
 
5.  Why did happiness change due to the results of the election? 
Why did people feel happiness and unhappiness from the result of the election? Traditional 
economists, who assume that individuals are selfish, might argue that people become happy 
only when they gain material benefit. In this section, we examine this hypothesis. 
In our survey on August 28
th
, we showed respondents seven policies that were the main 
issues at the election and asked respondents which party’s policy is preferable to them.12 
Among the policies, “child allowance policy” and “expressway toll policy” can be used to 
                                                   
12
 The seven policies are child allowance, expressway toll, transfer of administrative powers to 
local government, reconstruction of public finance, reform of bureaucratism, pension reform, 
and farm subsidies. 
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clarify whether people vote for a party in order to receive material benefit. For the former policy, 
33% of the respondents preferred the DPJ’s policy position, and 17% preferred the LDP’s; for 
the latter issue, these figures were 26% and 23％. Over 40% answered “I cannot say which is 
preferable” for both questions.13 The DPJ in general proposed more generous policies than the 
LDP; for the child allowance, the DPJ promised a larger allowance, and for the expressway toll, 
the elimination of tolls.
14
 Therefore, if DPJ took power, those households with children under 
15 and those who own cars would be better off. If the reason people support the DPJ is to get 
material benefits from its control of government, households with children under 15 years old 
and households with cars would see their happiness rise more than that of other households 
from a DPJ victory. Fortunately, our survey includes data on whether households have children 
under 15 years old, and how many cars they own. Thus, we can divide households into those 
who stood to receive material benefits from the victory of DPJ and those who did not.  
 We divide DPJ supporters according to whether they have cars or not, and calculate the 
normalized happiness on each day. Results for car ownership are shown in Figure 5. There is no 
evidence that car owners became happier on the 31
st 
than non-car owners (comparisons between 
two groups of the changes from 29
th
 to 31
st
; t=-0.212).
15
 
Similarly we divide the sample according to whether respondents have children under 15. 
                                                   
13
 Furthermore, 10% answered “I don’t know the policies of either party.” 
14
 The LDP criticized the DPJ’s policies, pointing out that they would require increased deficits. 
15
 The negative sign means that non-car owners became happier. 
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Results for households with children are presented in Figure 6. Although it looks like childless 
households became happier than other households, the difference between the groups of the 
changes from 29
th
 to 31
st
 is not significant (t=-0.644). These results suggest that DPJ supporters 
became happier for reasons other than the monetary benefits they stood to gain from the 
realization of the DPJ’s policies. These results indicate that people do not necessarily select their 
supporting party due to the material benefits they obtain.
16
  
The results of no difference between the groups might have been obtained because the 
election results were expected beforehand. To check this possibility, we repeated our analysis 
restricting the sample to those who answered that the election results were unexpected. 
Although households with cars became happier and those without cars became unhappier, the 
difference between the two groups was not significant (t= 0.459). As for child allowances, 
although the happiness of households with children didn’t change, and the happiness of those 
without children increased, the difference is not significant (t= -0.827). Therefore, our results 
are robust even if we restrict the sample to those who did not expect the election results. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper examined whether Japanese voters became happy and/or unhappy due to the results 
                                                   
16 They probably choose a party whose world view and opinion about society are consistent with 
their own. Preference for the individual candidates of a particular party may also be an important 
factor. 
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of an election that produced a historic government changeover. The former general election had 
also been a very heated one. Tsutsui et al. (2010) analyzed that election and found that while the 
supporters of the winning party became happy and those of the losers unhappy, these changes 
were not significant. Although the authors interpreted the result to indicate that Japanese people 
are apathetic about elections, they faced the problem that their monthly survey started four days 
after the election. Thus, their results do not rule out the possibility that Japanese became very 
happy and unhappy just after the election. 
To examine this possibility, we need to investigate how quickly the happiness and 
unhappiness changes brought about by the election results dissipated, so that we conducted a 
daily survey covering the voting day. Using these survey data we found that DPJ supporters, the 
winner, became significantly happier only on 31
st
, and the LDP and New Komeito supporters, 
the loser, became significantly unhappier on 31
st
.
17
 Japanese people become happy and unhappy 
just after the election according to their party preferences, but they returned to their previous 
level of happiness quickly. Rapid adaptation is the reason Tsutsui et al. (2010) did not find 
significant results. 
In addition, in our survey, we asked respondents whether their happiness went up or down 
                                                   
17
 Supporters of New Komeito became unhappier on 30
th
 (election day). It is widely known that 
supporters of New Komeito, which is backed by a large religious body named Soka-Gakkai, tend to 
be passionate. Therefore, we surmise that many of them watched the election results at the 
beginning of on the vote-counting on the 30
th
.   
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from the preceding day. Using these data, we confirmed that data on changes in happiness 
produce similar results to the data on happiness levels. 
To measure the impact of surprises, we asked respondents whether the election results were 
expected. We found that the happiness level of those whose expectation was confirmed did not 
change, while the happiness of those who were surprised by the results tended to change 
substantially.  
Finally, we investigated whether expected material benefit from policy changes accounted 
for the happiness changes. However, our empirical analysis did not find evidences for this 
hypothesis, suggesting that party support is not determined primarily by material benefits. It 
might be the case that sympathy with the policies and the candidates of a party are the most 
important factors in determining party affiliation. 
A problem with our study is that we could not separate the responses on 30
th
 into those 
before or after the election, since we did not obtain the exact time of response. Since the news 
of the election results started at 20:00 on TV, the responses on the 30
th
 include both some who 
knew about the election results and some who didn’t. Thus, we make do with comparing 
happiness on the 31
st
 with that on the 29
th
. 
Although our survey is not perfect, collecting daily data before and after voting day is 
innovative, and contributes to the elucidation of whether happiness varies due to election results 
21 
 
in Japan.  
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Table 1. Number of supporters of each party (Results of our survey) 
  TOTAL DPJ LDP New Komeito Small Parties NP DK DWA 
Count 1068 252 139 32 103 443 67 32 
Proportion (%) 100 23.6 13.0 3.0 9.6 41.5 6.3 3.0 
Note: Small Parties include Japanese Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, Your Party, 
New Party Nippon, People’s New Party, the Happiness Realization Party, Japan Renaissance 
Party, and New Party Daichi. NP, DK, and DWA stand for “Non-Affiliated,” “I Don’t Know,” 
and “I Don’t Want to Answer,” respectively. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper 
  
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
HAPPINESS 7476 6.144 2.218 0 10 
CHANGE IN HAPPINESS 7476 4.264 1.053 1 7 
SLEEP 7476 2.628 0.905 1 4 
HEALTH 7476 2.877 0.722 1 4 
WORK_DONE 7476 0.242 0.428 0 1 
WORK_AFTER 7476 0.128 0.334 0 1 
WORK_NOW 7476 0.125 0.331 0 1 
NEWS 7476 0.870 2.511 -5 5 
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Table 3. Estimation results of eq. (1) for DPJ supporters 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Coefficients P-Value Coefficients P-Value 
CONSTANT 6.290 0.000 5.100 0.000 
DPJ×DAY27 0.109 0.343 0.097 0.359 
DPJ×DAY28 -0.068 0.556 -0.063 0.552 
DPJ×DAY30 -0.016 0.888 -0.105 0.321 
DPJ×DAY31 0.313 0.006 0.178 0.092 
DPJ×DAY01 0.020 0.860 -0.004 0.972 
DPJ×DAY02 0.023 0.840 -0.016 0.880 
DAY27 0.054 0.333 0.111 0.034 
DAY28 -0.119 0.033 -0.062 0.234 
DAY30 -0.087 0.119 -0.076 0.139 
DAY31 -0.408 0.000 -0.326 0.000 
DAY01 -0.294 0.000 -0.234 0.000 
DAY02 -0.257 0.000 -0.216 0.000 
SLEEP 
  
0.014 0.486 
HEALTH 
  
0.332 0.000 
WORK_ DONE 
  
0.067 0.141 
WORK_AFTER 
  
-0.088 0.115 
WORK_NOW 
  
-0.111 0.062 
NEWS     0.199 0.000 
Number of observations 7476 7476 
R squared 0.021 0.174 
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Table 4.  Estimation results of eq. (1) for LDP supporters 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Coefficients P-Value Coefficients P-Value 
CONSTANT 6.290 0.000 5.102 0.000 
LDP×DAY27 -0.298 0.040 -0.240 0.072 
LDP×DAY28 -0.077 0.597 0.040 0.762 
LDP×DAY30 -0.169 0.245 -0.084 0.529 
LDP×DAY31 -0.368 0.011 -0.241 0.070 
LDP×DAY01 -0.114 0.431 -0.070 0.602 
LDP×DAY02 -0.198 0.171 -0.141 0.291 
DAY27 0.118 0.023 0.165 0.001 
DAY28 -0.125 0.017 -0.083 0.094 
DAY30 -0.069 0.187 -0.090 0.063 
DAY31 -0.286 0.000 -0.253 0.000 
DAY01 -0.274 0.000 -0.226 0.000 
DAY02 -0.226 0.000 -0.202 0.000 
SLEEP 
  
0.014 0.509 
HEALTH 
  
0.332 0.000 
WORK_DONE 
  
0.068 0.135 
WORK_AFTER 
  
-0.088 0.115 
WORK_NOW 
  
-0.109 0.068 
NEWS     0.199 0.000 
Number of observations 7476 7476 
R squared 0.020 0.174 
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Table 5.  Change in happiness of various groups between 29
th
 and 31
st
  
and between 29
th
 and 30
th
  
 
    Model 1 Model 2 
    Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
LDP From 29 to 30 -0.169 0.245 -0.084 0.529 
 
From 29 to 31 -0.368 0.011 -0.241 0.070 
DPJ From 29 to 30 -0.016 0.888 -0.105 0.321 
 
From 29 to 31 0.313 0.006 0.178 0.092 
NEW KOMEITO From 29 to 30 -0.647 0.023 -0.610 0.020 
 
From 29 to 31 -0.976 0.001 -0.960 0.000 
OLD RULING PARTY From 29 to 30 -0.282 0.034 -0.203 0.097 
 
From 29 to 31 -0.521 0.000 -0.411 0.001 
NEW RULING 
PARTY 
From 29 to 30 -0.043 0.699 
-0.112 
0.267 
 
From 29 to 31 0.247 0.024 0.143 0.157 
PRO-CABINET From 29 to 30 -0.350 0.027 -0.276 0.057 
 
From 29 to 31 -0.470 0.003 -0.327 0.024 
ANTI-CABINET From 29 to 30 0.239 0.018 0.187 0.044 
  From 29 to 31 0.347 0.001 0.257 0.005 
Note: Coefficient and P-Value are those on the day dummies representing the 30
th
 and 31
st
, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1. Normalized happiness of DPJ, LDP, and KOM supporters. 
Note: Normalized happiness is computed as a respondent’s happiness divided by the average 
happiness of the whole sample. Capped spikes represent standard errors. 
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Figure 2. Average normalized change in happiness of DPJ, LDP, and New Komeito supporters 
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Figure 3. Normalized happiness for DPJ supporters and whether the result was as expected or 
not 
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Figure 4. Normalized happiness for LDP supporters and whether the result was as expected or 
not 
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Figure 5. Normalized happiness of those who have at least one car and those who don’t have a 
car 
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Figure 6. Normalized happiness of those who have at least one child under 15 and those who 
don’t have a child under 15 
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